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Dragon Capital is entering Ukraine’s critical infrastructure through two channels — via the Amber Dragon infrastructure fund and a separate private Power One joint venture with former Ukrenergo CEO Volodymyr Kudrytskyi.
Against the backdrop of searches at Kudrytskyi’s residence and public debate surrounding his 2024 dismissal, this “double bet” looks like a reputational risk for Tomas Fiala — even though the EBRD has already approved a mandate letter and recognizes the project’s public benefit.
What Exactly Dragon Is Buying/Building
Amber Dragon (Fund). Public disclosures by international financial institutions describe the fund’s profile: IFC notes that Amber Dragon focuses on rebuilding critical infrastructure, targeting €350 million, while the EIB confirms its participation and investment mandate in Ukraine’s energy, transport, and digital infrastructure sectors. Separately, the EBRD has published a project description page regarding potential participation in the fund (up to €60 million). Together, this defines the institutional “umbrella” contour.
Power One (Private JV). On July 10, 2025, at the URC Conference in Rome, Dragon Capital, energy company Negen, and the EBRD signed a Mandate Letter for €21.1 million in financing for Power One — a portfolio of distributed, flexible generation assets. Structurally, Dragon owns 100% of Power One at launch, while Negen acts as the operational partner. These details are publicly fixed in Dragon’s press release and confirmed by the media.
Why Reputation Matters More Than IRR in the Grid Sector
Any distributed generation (DG) portfolio in Ukraine is physically and commercially tied to the grid of the transmission system operator (TSO) Ukrenergo and to long-term ancillary service contracts (reserves). Since 2024, Ukrenergo has been launching five-year special auctions with a deferred start of service provision — creating predictable cash flows for new capacities such as BESS and gas peaker plants. After four auctions, a total of 788 MW of fast reserves have been contracted; some services are scheduled to begin on December 1, 2026. This is a politically and tariff-sensitive segment — precisely where Power One will operate.
The Kudrytskyi Factor: “Noise” Around Any Deal
January 11, 2024: NABU and SAPO uncovered a scheme involving the misappropriation of electricity from Ukrenergo and the laundering of proceeds. The total losses exceeded 716 million UAH. Four individuals were charged, including the director of an Ukrenergo department — a direct subordinate of Kudrytskyi. This subordinate remains on NABU’s wanted list.
September 2024: The dismissal and resignation of independent directors. Two independent members of Ukrenergo’s supervisory board resigned, calling Kudrytskyi’s dismissal “politically motivated.” The story was widely covered by European media, framing the former TSO head’s subsequent career in a political light.
October 21, 2025: SBI searches. Investigative actions took place in a case involving alleged misconduct and embezzlement during Kudrytskyi’s leadership at Ukrenergo; he confirmed the searches and described them as politically motivated, while no charges were filed. For any investor, this represents a clear “red flag.”
As of the publication date, Kudrytskyi has not been formally charged in these cases, and the presumption of innocence applies. However, the very existence of investigations and the contentious history of his dismissal create a persistent reputational noise.
Is There a Conflict of Interest? What Fiala Will Need to Demonstrate Publicly
A “Chinese Wall” Between the Fund and the JV. Clearly documented governance policies: who makes decisions for Amber Dragon vs. Power One, how related-party overlaps are avoided, and what the structure of the Investment Committee and meeting protocols (IC minutes) look like in cases with elevated conflict optics. Given the participation of IFC, EIB, and EBRD in the fund, expectations for disclosure are at the European level.
Proactive Communication on Auctions and Contracts. For Power One, this means publishing specific lot codes, node commissioning schedules, benchmarks of service costs compared to EU markets, and explanations of systemic benefits (reducing outages, integrating renewables) — to counter any narrative of “tailored auctions.”
Finally, an Ethical Response to the “Revolving Door.” Whether consultations were held with NAZK or independent legal experts regarding cooling-off standards, and whether Kudrytskyi had personal influence over the rules relevant to current contracts (with documented dates and roles). This is not only about legal compliance but about meeting good governance expectations from LPs in the EU.
Undoubtedly, amid war and ongoing attacks on Ukraine’s energy system, every investment in flexibility and recovery is valuable — as confirmed by EBRD’s involvement. However, as has often happened in Ukraine, the reputational profile of a partner can easily outweigh technical or financial benefits if governance and transparency are not publicly demonstrated.
As one of the most prominent benchmarks for foreign investors, Tomas Fiala must set the bar higher than the “regulatory minimum”: separating the influence of the fund and the private JV, showing how decisions are made, and explaining transparently how TSO-linked services are monetized. Only then will Dragon’s double strategy — Amber Dragon + Power One — be perceived in Europe as a model of transparent reconstruction rather than a risk of excessive concentration and “overlapping roles.”
